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Attachment

Since early 1956, ORR has increased substantially its research effort on the economic aspects of the Soviet guided missile program. We now have primary responsibility, within CIA, for analyzing Soviet missile deployment activities, in addition to our continuing responsibility for estimating production capabilities and for producing cost and economic feasibility estimates. This expanded effort, which amounts to about 20 professional positions, reflects the movement of increasing numbers of Soviet missile systems from research and development status to series production and operational deployment. The importance of ORR's role in the guided missile intelligence picture will inevitably grow as the Soviet missile program continues to grow.

The field of guided missile intelligence is one in which covert reporting is becoming increasingly valuable. One of the biggest problems we face in this field is the actual identification of facilities engaged in quantity missile production in the Soviet Union. Some of the best material we have received so far has been derived from clandestine sources. One example is a series of covert reports obtained from a source available to a foreign liaison service. The case also illustrates the importance of reporting all indications of inter-plant relationships in industrial reports, as well as detailed information on the chronology of historical events. The first report from this source gave information which led to the identification of a former Soviet automotive plant as a producer of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. According to the source, this plant took over series production from a Moscow facility known to have been producing experimental missile prototypes, and this occurred several years earlier than any previous intelligence estimate of Soviet production of missiles in quantity. This information, together with re-evaluated data from other sources, thus resulted in a considerable change in our estimate of Soviet surface-to-surface ballistic missile production. On the basis of information given by this source, moreover, we have mounted a full-scale effort to ascertain from all available sources the current status and activities of this facility. As additional Soviet missile facilities are identified, we will be able to give a much sharper focus to our research and further collection efforts.

Another example of the usefulness of covert reporting in guided missile intelligence is a report, from a source with contacts in the Soviet Ministry of Defense, attributing certain statements to Marshal Zhukov. These statements, when analyzed in the light of other information, give considerable insight into current Soviet military thinking and policy on weapons production.

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Soviet policy statements of this sort, when they can be reliably attributed to officials or departments logically concerned with the problem, contribute directly to accurate interpretation of frequently fragmentary data on Soviet missile programs and intentions. We believe that sources with this type of contact can be used to obtain other important reflections of Soviet production and deployment policy.

We have taken a number of broad steps to provide the collectors with more detailed guidance in procuring information on this high priority national intelligence target. To this end, OPR and OSI have each assigned a senior guided missile specialist full-time to the DD/P. These analysts, in addition to providing specific guidance in collection planning for guided missile intelligence, are systematically briefing all DD/P professional personnel going into the field. OPR and OSI have taken advantage of the collection

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has indicated that they are a potentially valuable source of guided missile intelligence, and one specialist from OPR and OSI has been assigned on [REDACTED] to provide firsthand, current guidance in source selection and interrogation. Similar on-the-spot guidance had previously been provided in connection with the [REDACTED]

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The two offices have, in addition, prepared a comprehensive collection planning aid on the Soviet CB program to be used as background (primarily in the field) to familiarize the collector with types of information required and ways in which it may be collected. At present, we are preparing a master evaluated list of all reported missile launch sites in the USSR. This list, which will be revised quarterly and which will eventually include the satellites, will indicate priorities for further collection. As Soviet guided missile operational capabilities increase, accurate and detailed reporting on launching sites is assuming greatly increased intelligence significance and will be essential to our estimates of the magnitude and imminence of the Soviet guided missile threat -- a target which is, as you know, one of the highest priority national intelligence objectives.

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